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Abstract
This study explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions in a two-country R&D-
based growth model in which the market size of each country determines the incentives
for innovation. We nd that an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union
leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic economy. This result has two important
implications on innovation. First, it reduces the rates of innovation and economic growth.
Second, it causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a
negative e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages in the long run. We also derive
welfare implications and calibrate our model to data in the US and the UK to quantify the
e¤ects of labor unions on social welfare and wage inequality across countries. Our calibrated
model is able to explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and
the UK from 1980 to 2007. Furthermore, the decrease in unionsbargaining power leads to
quantitatively signicant welfare gains in the two countries.
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1 Introduction
This study explores the macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy R&D-based
growth model. We consider a two-country model in which a labor union bargains with employers
over wages and employment in each country and the market size of each country determines the
incentives for innovation. Within this growth-theoretic framework, we nd that an increase in
the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union leads to a decrease in employment in the domestic
economy. In contrast, an increase in the bargaining power of an employment-oriented union
leads to an increase in employment. Empirical studies1 often nd that increasing the degree of
unionization has a negative e¤ect on employment, which is consistent with our result under a wage-
oriented union. This result has two important implications on innovation. First, by decreasing
employment, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-oriented union reduces the rates of
innovation and economic growth. This theoretical implication is consistent with empirical studies
that nd negative e¤ects of unions on innovation and growth.2 Second, by decreasing employment
and the market size of the domestic economy, an increase in the bargaining power of a wage-
oriented union causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which in turn causes a
negative long-run e¤ect on domestic wages relative to foreign wages. In the long run, this negative
e¤ect on relative wage income across countries would dominate the positive e¤ect of labor unions
on wages if the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods is su¢ ciently large.
We also derive welfare implications and discuss them in the main text.
To provide an illustrative numerical analysis, we calibrate our model to data in the US and
the UK. We consider the cross-country e¤ects of labor unions between the US and the UK for the
following reasons. We consider the US because it is the largest economy in the world. The largest
trading partner of the US is the European Union. Within the European Union, the UK has a
similar set of institutions that govern unionization and collective bargaining as the US. As Card
et al. (2004) point out, "[a]s with other aspects of the economy, collective bargaining institutions
in these countries are broadly similar... Thus it is possible to compare the structure of wages for
workers whose wages are set by union contracts... A similar task is far more di¢ cult in other
countries including the major European countries...".
Figure 1a plots the HP-lter trends of labor income share of GDP from 1980 to 2007 in the US
and the UK.3 This gure shows a well-documented stylized fact that the labor share of income has
gradually declined since the early 1980s. Figure 1b plots the HP-lter trends of unemployment
rates in the two countries.4 This gure shows that unemployment has also gradually declined in
these two countries until 2007.5 We calibrate our model to compute the degree of unionswage
orientation and the decrease in workersbargaining power that enable the model to replicate this
simultaneous decrease in labor income share and unemployment in the two countries. We nd
that the degree of unionswage orientation must be stronger in the UK than in the US in order
1See for example Montgomery (1989), Blanchower et al. (1991), Nickell and Layard (1999) and Krol and
Svorny (2007).
2See for example Connolly et al. (1986), Hirsch and Link (1987), Acs and Audretsch (1988), Carmeci and
Mauro (2003) and Bradley et al. (2015). In contrast, Schnabel and Wagner (1994) and Addison et al. (2001) nd
positive e¤ects of unions on innovation and growth in Germany, which would be consistent with our results under
an employment-oriented union.
3Data source: OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs.
4Data source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and UK O¢ ce for National Statistics.
5We do not consider data after 2007 because of the nancial crisis.
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for the calibrated economies to match the data. We also explore the quantitative implications
on social welfare and wage inequality across the two countries. Our calibrated model is able to
explain about half of the decrease in relative wage between the US and the UK from 1980 to 2007.
Furthermore, we nd that both countries gain from the decrease in unionsbargaining power, but
the welfare improvement in the UK is greater than that in the US due to changes in relative wage
income. Specically, the welfare gains are equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of
5.2% in the US and 8.1% in the UK.
Figure 1a Figure 1b
This study relates to the literature on labor unions. Early studies in this literature focus on the
formulation of labor unionsobjective function; see for example Oswald (1985) for a survey. We
follow a common approach in the literature to specify a Stone-Geary union objective function over
wages and employment. Pemberton (1988) provides a microeconomic foundation for this union
objective function as "the outcome of an internal bargain between the leadership and membership"
in a managerial union. Our study relates most closely to a recent branch of this literature that
explores the e¤ects of labor unions on innovation and economic growth. Palokangas (1996) is the
seminal study in this branch of the literature. Subsequent studies, such as Palokangas (2000, 2004,
2005), Boone (2000) and Ji et al. (2015), also analyze the e¤ects of labor unions in R&D-based
growth models.6 Palokangas (1996, 2000, 2004, 2005) nds that increasing the bargaining power
of labor union serves to increase economic growth, whereas Boone (2000) nds that labor union
dampens economic growth. Ji et al. (2015) nd that labor union has both a negative growth
e¤ect via unemployment and a positive growth e¤ect via endogenous market structure, and these
two e¤ects exactly o¤set each other leaving an overall neutral e¤ect on growth. Our theoretical
model is able to replicate (via an alternative mechanism) the above results that increasing the
bargaining power of labor unions can have a positive e¤ect on growth and innovation (under an
employment-oriented union), a negative e¤ect on growth and innovation (under a wage-oriented
union) and a neutral e¤ect on growth and innovation (when the union is neither wage nor em-
ployment oriented).7 In addition to analyzing the e¤ects of labor unions on the level of innovation
6See also Peretto (2011) who explores the interaction between the market power of unions in the labor market
and the market power of rms in the product market.
7Chang et al. (2007) also nd that unionswage orientation determines the e¤ects of their bargaining power
on economic growth, but they consider an AK-type growth model in which economic growth is driven by capital
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within an economy as is common in the literature,8 our study also explores the e¤ects of labor
unions on the direction of innovation and wage inequality across countries, complementing the
abovementioned studies in the literature.
An interesting study by Acemoglu et al. (2001) considers the relationship between labor unions
and the direction of innovation across sectors within a country. They analyze the endogenous
formation of labor unions but take innovation as an exogenous change in productivity parameters,
whereas our study provides a complementary analysis by taking the existence of labor unions as
given and exploring their e¤ects on the direction of innovation across countries, instead of sectors.
This open-economy analysis allows us to explore the cross-country welfare e¤ects of unions and also
how the relative market size of countries a¤ects the allocation of R&D resources across countries.
In a standard model of directed technical change,9 the market size of a sector is measured by the
amount of labor in the sector. Similarly, the market size of a country is measured by the level of
employment in the country. The presence of labor unions a¤ects employment in the two countries,
which in turn a¤ects the amount of prots generated by intermediate goods. Consequently, labor
unions have an e¤ect on the value of inventions and hence the allocation of R&D resources across
countries.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 provides
analytical results. Section 4 conducts a quantitative analysis. The nal section concludes. Proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2 The model
In this section, we consider an open-economy version of the R&D-based growth model originated
from the seminal study by Romer (1990).10 In the model, there are two countries: Home and
Foreign. Final goods are produced by combining intermediate goods from the two countries via
a standard CES Armington aggregator. Intermediate goods in each country are produced using
domestic labor and di¤erentiated monopolistic inputs. The number of varieties of these di¤eren-
tiated inputs increases over time as a result of R&D. In each country, there is a representative
labor union that bargains with a representative federation of employers to determine wage and
employment, which in turn determines the market size of each country. As a result, changes in
employment in a country potentially a¤ect the direction of innovation across countries.
accumulation. Our study complements their interesting analysis by exploring the e¤ects of labor unions in an
open-economy R&D-based growth model.
8An exception is Palokangas (2005), who explores an open economy with unions and international R&D
spillovers; however, he does not consider the direction of innovation and wage inequality across countries.
9See for example Acemoglu (1998, 2002). Other inuential studies on directed technical change include Acemoglu
(2003), Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), Gancia and Bonglioli (2008) and Gancia and Zilibotti (2009).
10See also Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Segerstrom et al. (1990) for other
seminal studies on the R&D-based growth model and Gancia and Zilibotti (2005) for a survey of this literature.
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2.1 Household
In the Home country h, there is a representative household, which has the following lifetime utility
function:
Uh =
1Z
0
e t ln cht dt, (1)
where cht denotes consumption of nal goods at time t, and  > 0 is the subjective discount rate.
The household maximizes utility subject to the following asset-accumulation equation:11
_aht = rta
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t + b
h
t
 
Lh   lht
  ht   cht . (2)
aht is the amount of nancial assets (i.e., the equity shares of domestic and/or foreign rms that
generate monopolistic prots) owned by the household in the Home country, and rt is the real
interest rate.12 wht is the wage rate in the Home country. L
h is the inelastic supply of labor, and lht is
employment. Therefore, Lh  lht is unemployment, and the unemployment rate is uht  1  lht =Lh.13
bht is unemployment benet, and 
h
t is a lump-sum tax levied by the government on the household.
From standard dynamic optimization, the Euler equation is14
_cht
cht
= rt   . (3)
There are analogous conditions and variables with a superscript f in the Foreign country.
2.2 Final goods
Final goods are homogeneous across countries, and their production is perfectly competitive. We
also assume that they are freely traded across countries.15 Final goods are produced with the
following CES Armington aggregator:
Yt =
h
(Xht )
(" 1)=" + (1  )(Xft )(" 1)="
i"=(" 1)
, (4)
11We also impose the usual no-Ponzi-game condition that requires the households lifetime budget constraint to
be satised.
12rt is not indexed by a country superscript because we consider a global nancial market. Our derivations
are robust to any distribution of nancial assets across the two countries. In other words, we do not impose any
restriction on which country owns more (or even all) of the monopolistic rms and whether there is any foreign bond
holding between the two countries. The distribution of nancial assets across countries a¤ects the relative level
of consumption across countries, but not the steady-state equilibrium levels of other variables. The households
budget constraints ensure the balance of payments; see Appendix B for the derivations. One special case is that all
domestic (foreign) rms are owned by the domestic (foreign) household and that there is zero foreign bond holding.
Only when we examine welfare implications, we focus on this special case to pin down the levels of consumption in
the two countries.
13In this simple model, unemployment is caused by the union. In the absence of the union, all labor Lh will be
employed by rms.
14Also, the transversality condition requires rt > _aht =a
h
t , which holds on the balanced growth path given the log
utility function and  > 0.
15As a result, we do not impose any restriction on the location of the production of nal goods. Suppose all nal
goods are produced in the Foreign (Home) country. Then, the Home (Foreign) country would import nal goods
and export intermediate goods.
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whereXht andX
f
t are respectively intermediate goods produced in the Home and Foreign countries.
The parameter " > 116 is the Armington elasticity of substitution between the two types of
intermediate goods, and the parameter  2 (0; 1) determines their relative importance. We choose
nal goods as the numeraire, and the standard price index of nal goods is
1 =
h
"
 
P ht
1 "
+ (1  )"(P ft )1 "
i1=(1 ")
, (5)
where we have set the price of nal goods to one. P ht and P
f
t are respectively the price of X
h
t and
Xft . The conditional demand functions for intermediate goods are
Xht =


P ht
"
Yt, (6)
Xft =

1  
P ft
"
Yt. (7)
2.3 Intermediate goods and labor union
There is a unit continuum of rms producing intermediate goods in each country. The production
function of Xht is given by
Xht = (l
h
t )

Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di, (8)
where lht is the employment of labor and x
h
t (i) is di¤erentiated input i 2 [0; Nht ]. We also impose
the following parameter restrictions: ;  2 (0; 1) and +  < 1. Here we follow previous studies
on unions and bargaining such as Palokangas (1996, 2005), Chang et al. (2007), Chang and Hung
(2015) and Ji et al. (2015) to assume decreasing returns to scale,17 allowing the rms to have
positive prot in order to facilitate the bargaining process between the employersfederation and
the labor union.18 The prot function of the representative rm is
ht = P
h
t X
h
t   wht lht  
Z Nht
0
pht (i)x
h
t (i)di, (9)
where pht (i) is the price of x
h
t (i). The rm chooses x
h
t (i) to maximize 
h
t . The conditional demand
function for xht (i) is
pht (i) = P
h
t (l
h
t )
[xht (i)]
 1. (10)
16McDaniel and Balistreri (2003) provide a survey of empirical estimates of this Armington elasticity of substi-
tution. Although point estimates vary across studies, they are mostly larger than one.
17This assumption can be justied by the presence of a xed factor input owned by the rms. For example, this
xed factor input may be the entrepreneurial talent of the rmsowners. Given that not everyone possesses this
entrepreneurial talent, there is no free entry in this sector generating a monopolistic rent that is captured by the
rmsowners.
18As  +  ! 1, the bargaining power of the two parties would cease to have any inuence on the equilibrium
level of employment as we will show in (25) and (26).
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Departing from models without labor union, we follow previous studies to consider a repre-
sentative labor union that bargains with a representative federation of employers to determine
wage wht and employment l
h
t . For simplicity, we consider a closed shop union under which only
union members are eligible for employment. As in Pemberton (1988) and Chang et al. (2007), we
consider a managerial union whose objective is inuenced by the union leadersdesire for a larger
membership and the membersdesire for a higher wage. Formally, the unions objective is given
by a standard Stone-Geary function:19
Oht = (w
h
t   bht )!
h
(lht )
h . (11)
The parameter !h > 0 measures the weight that the union places on workersincremental wage
income from employment (i.e., wage minus unemployment benet). The parameter h > 0 mea-
sures the weight that the union places on membership. For simplicity, we normalize h to unity
and use !h to measure the weight that the union places on wage relative to membership; i.e., we
focus on h = 1 for the rest of the analysis.20 When !h > 1 (!h < 1), we refer to the union as
being wage-oriented (employment-oriented).
The employersfederation and the labor union bargain over wht and l
h
t .
21 The generalized Nash
bargaining function is
max
wht ; l
h
t
Bht = (O
h
t )
h(ht )
1 h , (12)
where the parameter h 2 (0; 1) measures the bargaining power of the labor union relative to the
employers. The bargaining solutions are
@Bht
@wht
= 0, (w
h
t   bht )lht
ht
=
!hh
1  h , (13)
@Bht
@lht
= 0, w
h
t l
h
t   P ht Xht
ht
=
h
1  h . (14)
There are analogous conditions for wft and l
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.4 Di¤erentiated inputs
In each country, there is a continuum of industries producing di¤erentiated inputs i 2 [0; Nht ]. Each
di¤erentiated input i is produced by a monopolist who owns a patent on the production technology.
For simplicity, we follow Acemoglu (2002) to assume that these di¤erentiated inputs are produced
using nal goods. In particular, one unit of nal goods produces one unit of di¤erentiated input;
therefore, the cost of producing xht (i) units of di¤erentiated input is x
h
t (i) units of nal goods,
19Here we follow Chang et al. (2007) to assume that the union objective function depends only on current wages
and employment. This simplifying assumption allows for a tractable analysis of transition dynamics.
20Our results are robust to h > 0 (derivations available upon request), but some of the expressions become more
complicated in this case.
21In this study, we focus on e¢ cient bargaining. In the case of right-to-manage bargaining (under which the union
and employers bargain over wages only), equilibrium employment and economic growth are unambiguously decreas-
ing in the unions bargaining power, contradicting evidence from some empirical studies (discussed in footnote 2).
Derivations are available upon request.
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which have been chosen as the numeraire. The prot function of the monopolist in industry i is
given by
ht (i) = p
h
t (i)x
h
t (i)  xht (i) = P ht (lht )[xht (i)]   xht (i), (15)
where the second equality uses (10). Di¤erentiating (15) with respect to xht (i), we nd the familiar
prot-maximizing price of xht (i) given by p
h
t (i) = 1=. Substituting p
h
t (i) = 1= into (10) and (15)
yields
xht (i) = [
2P ht (l
h
t )
]1=(1 )  xht , (16)
ht (i) =

1  


xht (i) =

1  


[2P ht (l
h
t )
]1=(1 )  ht . (17)
There are analogous conditions for xft and 
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.5 R&D
The invention of a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs for the Home country requires h units
of nal goods. Similarly, the invention of a new variety of di¤erentiated inputs for the Foreign
country requires f units of nal goods. In other words, we consider the lab-equipment R&D
specication as in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).22 In particular, the innovation process of new
varieties for the Home country is given by
_Nht = R
h
t =
h, (18)
where Rht is the amount of nal goods devoted to creating new varieties for the Home country.
23
Suppose we denote vht as the value of an invention in the Home country. Free entry in the R&D
sector implies
(vht   h) _Nht = 0. (19)
The familiar Bellman equation is
rt =
ht + _v
h
t
vht
, (20)
Intuitively, the Bellman equation equates the interest rate to the asset return per unit of asset,
where the asset return is the monopolistic prot ht plus any potential capital gain _v
h
t . There are
analogous conditions for vft in the Foreign country.
22In Section 2.8, we will discuss the implications under an alternative R&D specication.
23It is useful to note that we do not impose any restriction on the location of R&D. An inventor in either country
may create a new variety for the Home country with productivity 1=h or for the Foreign country with productivity
1=f .
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2.6 Government
In each country, there is a government that determines unemployment benet and levies a lump-
sum tax on the household to balance the scal budget. The balanced-budget condition in the
Home country is
ht = b
h
t
 
Lh   lht

. (21)
To be consistent with balanced growth, we assume that unemployment benet bht is proportional
to the value of domestic output P ht X
h
t ; i.e., b
h
t = b
h
P ht X
h
t , where b
h
> 0 is a policy parameter.
There are analogous conditions for  ft and b
f
t in the Foreign country.
2.7 Decentralized equilibrium
An equilibrium is a time path of allocations fcht ; cft ; Yt; Xht ; Xft ; xht (i); xft (i); lht ; lft ; Rht ; Rft g, prices
frt; wht ; wft ; P ht ; P ft ; pht (i); pft (i); vht ; vft g and scal policies fht ;  ft ; bht ; bft g such that the following
conditions hold at each instance of time:
 the representative household in the Home country chooses fcht g to maximize utility taking
frt; wht ; bht ; ht g as given;
 the representative household in the Foreign country chooses fcft g to maximize utility taking
frt; wft ; bft ;  ft g as given;
 perfectly competitive nal-goods rms produce fYtg to maximize prot taking prices fP ht ; P ft g
as given;
 intermediate-goods rms in the Home country produce fXht g to maximize prot taking prices
fP ht ; pht (i)g as given;
 intermediate-goods rms in the Foreign country produce fXft g to maximize prot taking
prices fP ft ; pft (i)g as given;
 in the Home country, a representative federation representing intermediate-goods rms bar-
gains with a representative labor union to determine fwht ; lht g;
 in the Foreign country, a representative federation representing intermediate-goods rms
bargains with a representative labor union to determine fwft ; lft g;
 monopolistic rms in the Home country produce di¤erentiated inputs fxht (i)g and set fpht (i)g
to maximize prot;
 monopolistic rms in the Foreign country produce di¤erentiated inputs fxft (i)g and set
fpft (i)g to maximize prot;
 R&D rms choose fRht ; Rft g to maximize prot taking frt; vht ; vft g as given;
 the market-clearing condition for nal goods holds such that Yt = Rht +Rft +Nht xht +N ft xft +
cht + c
f
t ;
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 the government in the Home country balances its scal budget given by ht = bht
 
Lh   lht

;
 the government in the Foreign country balances its scal budget given by  ft = bft (Lf   lft ).
2.7.1 Equilibrium employment
Here we rst derive the equilibrium levels of employment in the two countries. Substituting (8)
and (10) into (9) yields the prot function of intermediate goods in the Home country given by
ht = (1  )P ht (lht )
Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di  wht lht = (1  )P ht Xht   wht lht . (22)
Substituting (22) into the bargaining solution in (14) yields
wht l
h
t =

 + h(1    )P ht (lht ) Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di =

 + h(1    )P ht Xht , (23)
where labor income share wht l
h
t =P
h
t X
h
t = + 
h(1    ) is increasing in the unions bargaining
power h. Then, substituting (23) into (22) yields
ht = (1  h)(1    )P ht (lht )
Z Nht
0
[xht (i)]
di = (1  h)(1    )P ht Xht . (24)
Substituting (23), (24) and bht = b
h
P ht X
h
t into the bargaining solution in (13) yields the equilibrium
level of employment in the Home country given by
lht =
 + (1  !h)h(1    )
b
h
 lh, (25)
where employment lh is decreasing in the unions wage orientation !h and is ambiguous with
respect to its bargaining power h depending on the value of !h. We impose parameter restrictions
to ensure lht 2 (0; Lh). By analogous inference, the equilibrium level of employment in the Foreign
country is given by
lft =
 + (1  !f )f (1    )
b
f
 lf . (26)
We also impose parameter restrictions to ensure lft 2 (0; Lf ). Equations (25) and (26) give
the equilibrium levels of employment flh; lfg regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤ the
balanced growth path.
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2.7.2 Relative wage and relative technologies across countries
We now derive the relative wage across countries. Combining (6) and (7) yields the relative
demand function for intermediate goods given by
P ht
P ft
=

1  

Xht
Xft
 1="
. (27)
Substituting (16) into (8) yields the production of intermediate goods Xht given by
Xht = (l
h)=(1 )(2P ht )
=(1 )Nht . (28)
Substituting (28) and the analogous condition for Xft into (27) yields
P ht
P ft
=


1  
 (1 )"
+(1 )"

lh
lf
  
+(1 )" Nht
N ft
  (1 )
+(1 )"
, (29)
which determines the relative price ofXht andX
f
t . Substituting (16) into (23) yields the equilibrium
wage rate in the Home country given by
wht = 
2=(1 )  + h(1    ) (P ht )1=(1 )(lh)  1  1  Nht . (30)
Combining (30) and the analogous expression for wft yields an expression for the relative wage
across countries. If we substitute the relative price in (29) into this expression, we would obtain
the equilibrium relative wage given by
wht
wft
=
 + h(1    )
 + f (1    )


1  
 "
+(1 )"

lh
lf
 ++(1  )"
+(1 )" Nht
N ft
 (1 )(" 1)
+(1 )"
, (31)
which is decreasing in relative employment lh=lf but increasing in relative technology Nht =N
f
t .
Equation (31) gives the equilibrium relative wage regardless of whether the economy is on or o¤
the balanced growth path. Proposition 1 characterizes the dynamic property of Nht =N
f
t .
Proposition 1 There is a unique and globally stable steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t .
When Nht =N
f
t is below (above) this steady-state value, N
h
t =N
f
t increases (decreases) until N
h
t =N
f
t
reaches the steady state, at which point Nht and N
f
t grow at the same rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Next we derive the steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t . In the long run, innovation takes
place in both countries; therefore, we have vht = 
h, which in turn implies that _vht = 0. Substituting
_vht = 0 into (20), we obtain the equilibrium value of an invention in the Home country given by
vh =
h
r
=

1  


[2P h(lh)]1=(1 )
r
, (32)
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where the second equality follows from (17). Combining (32) with the analogous expression for
vf , we obtain the relative value of inventions across countries given by
vh
vf
=

P h
P f
1=(1 )
lh
lf
=(1 )
=
h
f
, (33)
where the second equality follows from vh = h and vf = f . Combining (29) and (33) yields the
steady-state equilibrium value of Nht =N
f
t given by
Nht
N ft
=

f
h
+(1 )"

1  
"
lh
lf
(" 1)
, (34)
which is increasing in relative employment lh=lf capturing the market-size e¤ect on the direction
of innovation across countries. Intuitively, a higher level of employment in the Home country
increases both the amount of prots generated by intermediate goods and the value of inventions
in the country. As a result, more inventions are created for this country. Lemma 1 summarizes
this result on a positive relationship between the direction of innovation Nht =N
f
t and the relative
market size lh=lf .24
Lemma 1 The steady-state value of Nht =N
f
t is increasing in relative employment level l
h=lf .
Proof. Use (34) and recall that " > 1.
Finally, we substitute (34) into (31) to derive the steady-state equilibrium relative wage.
wht
wft
=
 + h(1    )
 + f (1    )

f
h
(1 )(" 1)

1  
"
lh
lf
(" 1) 1
. (35)
Equation (35) shows that the steady-state value of wht =w
f
t is increasing in relative employment
lh=lf if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than (1 + )=.
2.8 Economic growth and social welfare
In Lemma 2, we derive the steady-state equilibrium growth rate, which is monotonically increasing
in the equilibrium levels of employment flh; lfg.25 The implied negative relationship between un-
employment and growth is consistent with the empirical evidence in Gordon (1997) and Brauninger
24Although our model features the scale e¤ect as we will show in the next section, this result would continue to
hold in a scale-invariant semi-endogenous-growth version of the model. In other words, the direction of innovation
across countries will continue to depend on the relative market size of the two countries because the market-size
e¤ect requires only the level of technology (but not the growth rate of technology) to depend on the size of the
domestic market.
25This is known as the scale e¤ect in the literature. In a scale-invariant semi-endogenous-growth version of the
model, an increase in employment would still lead to a higher growth rate in the short run (i.e., before the economy
reaches the new balanced growth path).
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and Pannenberg (2002), who nd that higher unemployment reduces growth. Therefore, whenever
labor unions decrease employment, they also decrease economic growth.26
Lemma 2 The steady-state equilibrium growth rate of consumption is given by
g = (1  )(1+)=(1 )
"
"
 
lh
(" 1)
(h)(1 )(" 1)
+ (1  )"
 
lf
(" 1)
(f )(1 )(" 1)
# 1
(1 )(" 1)
  . (36)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Using (1), we can express the representative households lifetime welfare on the balanced growth
path as
U j =
1


ln cj0 +
g


, (37)
where j 2 fh; fg and we have dened t = 0 as the time when the economy reaches the balanced
growth path. All the previous derivations are robust to the distribution of assets across countries;
however, to derive the level of consumption in each country, we now need to make an additional
assumption on the cross-country distribution of assets (i.e., the equity shares of monopolistic
rms in the two countries). Following the standard treatment in the literature,27 we assume home
bias in asset holding under which domestic (foreign) rms are owned by the domestic (foreign)
household. Furthermore, we assume zero foreign bond holding. Under these assumptions, we
derive the following expression for ln cj0 and U
j in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3 Under home bias in asset holding, the steady-state welfare function is given by
U j =
1


lnN j0 + ln

j

[(1 + ) + g]

+
g


. (38)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Equation (38) shows that welfare U j is increasing in the equilibrium growth rate g, which is
given by (36), and in the balanced-growth level of technology N j0 , which is determined by (34).
In this model, when the economy is on a transition path, new varieties are created only for one
country until the economy reaches the new balanced growth path along which Nht and N
f
t grow at
the same rate. In other words, whenever the steady-state value of Nht =N
f
t increases (decreases),
it must be the case that _Nht > 0 and _N
f
t = 0 ( _N
h
t = 0 and _N
f
t > 0) during transition.
26If we consider an alternative innovation process in which labor is the factor input for R&D, then the rela-
tionship between employment and economic growth could be di¤erent. For example, decreasing employment in
the production sector may lead to an increase in R&D employment and growth. Therefore, the lab-equipment
innovation process in this study seems to be more consistent with empirical evidence on employment and growth in
e.g., Gordon (1997) and Brauninger and Pannenberg (2002). Furthermore, although the lab-equipment innovation
process ignores intertemporal knowledge spillovers on R&D, the expanding varieties of intermediate goods improve
labor productivity and increase the wage rate of labor as shown in (30).
27See for example Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010).
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3 Macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions
In this section, we explore the macroeconomic implications of labor unions. In particular, we are
interested in the e¤ects of a labor union becoming more wage oriented (i.e., !h increases) and
having more bargaining power relative to employers (i.e., h increases). In Section 3.1, we analyze
the e¤ects of increasing !h.28 In Section 3.2, we analyze the e¤ects of increasing h.
3.1 Wage orientation of labor unions
Equation (25) shows that an increase in the unions wage orientation !h leads to a decrease in
employment lh in the Home country. Intuitively, as the union in the Home country becomes more
wage oriented, it demands a higher wage and depresses labor demand. Given that employment
lf in the Foreign country is independent of !h, an increase in !h leads to a decrease in relative
employment lh=lf , which in turn increases relative wage wht =w
f
t across countries in the short run
(i.e., for a given Nht =N
f
t ) as shown in (31). This short-run increase in relative wage is partly due
to the direct e¤ect of the decrease in relative employment and partly due to an indirect e¤ect
via the increase in relative price P ht =P
f
t as shown in (29). In the long run, N
h
t =N
f
t decreases to
a lower steady-state value as shown in (34) because the decrease in relative employment lh=lf
changes the relative market size of the two countries and causes innovation to be directed towards
the Foreign country. This negative market-size e¤ect partly o¤sets and may even dominate the
positive price e¤ect on relative wage wht =w
f
t . Equation (35) shows that the overall e¤ect of !
h
on wht =w
f
t would be negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is su¢ ciently large (i.e.,
" > (1 + )=). From Lemma 2, we see that the decrease in employment also reduces economic
growth in the long run. Furthermore, Nht =N
f
t decreasing to a lower steady-state value implies
_Nht = 0 and _N
f
t > 0 until the economy reaches the new balanced growth path. Therefore, the
increase in !h also reduces steady-state welfare in the Home country due to the lower growth rate,
but the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country is ambiguous due to the opposing e¤ects of g and N f0
on U f in (38). We summarize these results in Proposition 2. Figure 2 plots the transitional path
of wht =w
f
t in response to a permanent increase in !
h at time t.
Proposition 2 As the labor union becomes more wage oriented, employment in the domestic
economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic economy
relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in employment
in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which causes
a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage in the long run is
negative if and only if the substitution elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by (1 + )=.
Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth rate and domestic welfare are negative.
Proof. See Appendix A.
28The e¤ects of increasing unemployment benet b
h
are the same as increasing !h.
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Figure 2
3.2 Bargaining power of labor unions
In this subsection, we rst consider the case of a wage-oriented union (i.e., !h > 1). Equation
(25) shows that an increase in the unions bargaining power h leads to a decrease in employment
lh if and only if the union is wage oriented. This decrease in employment lh has a positive e¤ect
on the wage rate in the Home country as shown in (30). Furthermore, an increase in the unions
bargaining power increases the share of output that goes to wage income as shown in (23). These
two positive e¤ects on wht lead to an unambiguous increase in relative wage w
h
t =w
f
t in the short run
(i.e., for a given Nht =N
f
t ) as shown in (31). However, in the long run, the decrease in employment
lh exerts a negative market-size e¤ect on wht =w
f
t by decreasing N
h
t =N
f
t . This negative market-size
e¤ect would dominate the abovementioned positive e¤ects if the elasticity of substitution between
Home and Foreign intermediate goods is su¢ ciently large; i.e.,29
" > 1 +
!h
!h   1

1
 + h(1    )

 ".
The transitional path of wht =w
f
t in response to an increase in !
h is similar to Figure 2, except that
the threshold of " is now given by " instead of (1 + )=. Lemma 2 shows that the decrease in
employment also reduces economic growth in the long run. Together with the decrease in Nht =N
f
t ,
steady-state welfare in the Home country decreases, but the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country
is ambiguous due to the opposing e¤ects of g and N f0 on U
f in (38). We summarize these results
in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When a wage-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in the do-
mestic economy decreases. This decrease in employment increases the wage rate in the domestic
economy relative to the foreign economy in the short run. In the long run, the decrease in em-
ployment in the domestic economy causes innovation to be directed to the foreign economy, which
29It is useful to note that " > (1 + )= given an upper bound imposed on !h to ensure lh > 0 in (25).
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causes a negative e¤ect on the relative wage. The overall long-run e¤ect of increasing a wage-
oriented unions bargaining power on the relative wage is negative if and only if the substitution
elasticity " is greater than a threshold given by ". Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth
rate and domestic welfare are negative.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Next we consider an employment-oriented union (i.e., !h < 1). In this case, (25) shows that
an increase in the unions bargaining power h raises employment lh in the domestic economy.
Although this increase in employment causes a negative e¤ect on relative wage wht =w
f
t as shown in
(31), the increase in h nevertheless increases relative wage wht =w
f
t in the short run. This positive
short-run e¤ect of !h on relative wage wht =w
f
t is due to the increase in the share of output that
goes to wage income as shown in (23). As for the long-run e¤ect of the unions bargaining power
h on relative wage wht =w
f
t , an increase in 
h further increases relative wage under an employment-
oriented union because the market-size e¤ect (by increasing Nht =N
f
t ) works in favor of increasing
wht =w
f
t due to the increase in employment l
h. Lemma 2 shows that this increase in employment
also stimulates economic growth in the long run. Together with the increase in Nht =N
f
t , steady-
state welfare in the Home country increases. In this case, the welfare e¤ect in the Foreign country
is also positive due to the positive e¤ect of g on U f in (38). We summarize these results in
Proposition 4. Figure 3 plots the transitional path of wht =w
f
t in response to a permanent increase
in the bargaining power h of an employment-oriented union at time t.
Proposition 4 When an employment-oriented union has more bargaining power, employment in
the domestic economy increases. This increase in employment causes a negative e¤ect on the wage
rate in the domestic economy. However, the increase in the unions bargaining power also increases
the share of output that goes to labor income. The overall e¤ect on the relative wage is positive
in the short run. In the long run, the increase in employment causes innovation to be directed to
the domestic economy, which leads to an additional positive e¤ect on the relative wage. Therefore,
the overall long-run e¤ect of increasing an employment-oriented unions bargaining power on the
relative wage is always positive. Finally, the e¤ects on the steady-state growth rate and welfare in
both countries are positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 3
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4 Quantitative analysis
To illustrate how large an e¤ect labor unions could have on the macroeconomy, we calibrate our
stylized model to data in the US and the UK to see if it can replicate the simultaneous decrease
in labor income share and unemployment from 1980 to 2007. An assumption we make is that
the economy is at an initial steady state in 1980 and converges to a new steady state in 2007.
Therefore, we consider the long-run trend values of labor income share and unemployment as in
Figure 1. Furthermore, we assume that the decrease in labor income share is due to a decrease in
workersbargaining power fh; fg.30 However, it is useful to note that we do not rule out other
fundamental reasons for the decrease in labor income share; for example, globalization may reduce
the bargaining power of workers, which in turn decreases labor income share. Given the change in
workersbargaining power fh; fg, we compute the implied values of the unionswage orientation
f!h; !fg that enable the model to deliver the observed decrease in the unemployment rates in
the two countries. Given that our goal is to examine the e¤ects of unionsbargain power, we
hold other structural parameters constant when performing this numerical experiment. Finally,
we also explore the quantitative implications on social welfare and wage inequality across the two
countries.
The model features the following parameters f; "; ; ; ; h; f ; Lh; Lf ; bh; bf ; h; f ; !h; !fg.
We dene the US as the Home country h and the UK as the Foreign country f . We follow
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) to consider a standard value for the discount rate  = 0:05. As for
the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign intermediate goods, we set " to 3.5, which
takes on an intermediate value of the empirical estimates summarized in McDaniel and Balistreri
(2003). For the parameters in the intermediate-goods production function (8), we set the degree
of labor intensity  to 0.5 and the intensity of intermediate goods  to 0.2. It is useful to recall
that labor income share is given by  + h(1      ) in the model. Therefore,  is the lower
bound of labor income share, and 1    is the upper bound. Given that labor income share has
fallen to as low as 0.54 in the US in recent years, we consider labor income share bounded between
0.5 and 0.8 to be reasonable. As for the share parameter  in the nal-goods production function
(4), we calibrate it using the relative wage of the two countries, and wht =w
f
t is 1.45 in 1980.
31 As
for the R&D productivity parameters fh; fg, it can be shown that one of these parameters can
be set as a free parameter without changing the results.32 Therefore, we normalize f to one and
calibrate h using the long-run average growth rate in the two economies for which g is about
2%. We normalize Lf to one and calibrate Lh by matching the relative size of labor force in the
30For example, Kristal (2013) uses industry-level data to show that the decrease in labor income share in the US
since the early 1980s is due to the decrease in unionization and workersbargaining power; see also Kristal (2010)
and Judzik and Sala (2013) for evidence based on country-level data from a sample of countries including the UK
and the US.
31Data source: Penn World Table, and OECD Annual Indicators on Unit Labour Costs. From the Penn World
Table, we obtain PPP-adjusted real income per worker. Then, we use OECD data on labor income share to compute
real wage income per worker in the two countries.
32In Appendix C, we show that it is the ratio    f=h(1 )(" 1) [=(1   )]" that a¤ects the quantitative
results. Given a value of , the individual values of fh; f ; g do not matter; therefore, one of these parameters
can be treated as a free parameter. Furthermore, the calibrated parameter values in Table 1 imply a value of
Rh=Rf = 6:08, which is close to the relative R&D expenditure of 5.73 between the US and the UK in 1981; data
from OECD R&D Statistics.
17
two countries in 1980.33 To match the unemployment rates, we calibrate the values of fbh; bfg.
We use the trend values of labor income share in the two countries in 1980 and 2007 to calibrate
respectively the values of fh; fg in 1980 and 2007. Then, we calibrate the values of f!h; !fg so
that the calibrated economies replicate the observed decrease in the unemployment rates from 8%
to 5% in the US and from 10% to 5% in the UK.34 Table 1 summarizes the calibrated parameter
values.
Table 1: Calibrated parameter values
 "    h f Lh Lf b
h
b
f
!h !f h f
0:05 3:5 0:5 0:2 0:41 0:54 1:0 4:1 1:0 0:13 0:43 1:14 1:71 0:53! 0:17 0:53! 0:43
Figure 1a shows that labor income shares in the US and the UK were about the same at 0.66
in 1980. By 2007, labor income share in the US falls to 0.55, whereas labor income share in the
UK decreases only slightly to 0.63. Our model provides the following structural interpretation of
this empirical pattern: the bargaining power of workers falls by a much larger degree in the US
than in the UK, as indicated in Table 1. The calibrated value of h = 0:17 being smaller than the
calibrated value of f = 0:43 is consistent with the casual observation that unions in the US are
less powerful than those in the UK; for example, the union density of 11.6% in the US is lower
than that of 27.9% in the UK in 2007.35
Figure 1b shows that unemployment rates in the two countries fall to a similar value of 5%. The
fact that unemployment decreases in response to a decrease in the bargaining power of workers
implies that unions are wage-oriented (i.e., f!h; !fg > 1).36 Furthermore, the degree of wage
orientation must be larger in the UK in order for its unemployment rate to fall by a larger
magnitude despite the smaller decrease in its workersbargaining power. Table 1 shows that the
degree of wage orientation !f in the UK is 1.71, which is larger than !h = 1:14 in the US. Under
these values of f!h; !fg, decreasing workersbargaining power h from 0.53 to 0.17 causes the
unemployment rate to decrease from 8% to 5% in the US, whereas decreasing f from 0.53 to 0.43
causes the unemployment rate to decrease from 10% to 5% in the UK.
In the rest of this section, we simulate the long-run e¤ects of decreasing workersbargaining
power fh; fg on relative wage in (35) and welfare in (38) while holding other parameter values
constant. We consider the calibrated parameter values and changes in fh; fg in Table 1. The
decrease in workersbargaining power fh; fg leads to an increase in employment flh; lfg, which
in turn increases the long-run growth rate from 2% to 2.16%.37 This positive growth e¤ect benets
33Data source: World Development Indicators, and Federal Reserve Economic Data.
34Our model features exogenous labor-force participation in the two countries. In the data, the labor-force
participation rates increase from the early 1980s to 2007 by about two and four percentage points in the US and
the UK respectively. This larger increase in the labor-force participation rate in the UK should reinforce its larger
decrease in the unemployment rate. However, our model takes the labor force as given and does not shed any light
on whether the changes in labor-force participation are caused by labor unions. Therefore, we focus on changes in
unemployment which is determined by the bargaining power of labor unions in our analysis.
35Data source: OECD Trade Union Statistics.
36In the case of employment-oriented unions, decreasing their bargaining power would lead to lower employment
and higher unemployment.
37For example, Carmeci and Mauro (2003) estimate dynamic panel regressions using data on OECD countries
and nd that decreasing labor union density indeed has a positive e¤ect on long-run growth.
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the two countries equally. However, the larger reduction in unemployment in the UK than that
in the US causes innovation to be directed to the UK and gives rise to a decrease in Nh=N f .
Using data on patent grants, we construct an empirical data series on Nht =N
f
t in Figure 4 and
nd that Nht =N
f
t indeed decreases to a lower value from 1980 to 2007. We construct this time series
using data from the United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) and European Patent
O¢ ce (EPO).38 Specically, we use the number of patents granted by the USPTO to inventors
in the US and the UK from 1977 to 2007 to obtain a time series for the ow _Nht .
39 Then, we
compute the accumulated stock of patents granted by the USPTO to construct a time series for
the stock Nht . Similarly, we use the number of patents granted by the EPO to inventors in the US
and the UK each year to obtain a time series for _N ft .
40 Then, we compute the accumulated stock
of patents granted by the EPO to construct a time series for N ft .
Figure 4
The decrease in Nh=N f a¤ects the two countries di¤erently due to changes in relative wage
income. In the data, relative wage wht =w
f
t decreases from 1.45 in 1980 to 1.03 in 2007,
41 whereas
wht =w
f
t decreases from 1.45 to 1.26 in our simulation, which explains about half of the decrease
in relative wage in the data. Finally, we also simulate the long-run welfare changes in the two
countries.42 We nd that as a result of the increase in employment and growth, welfare improves
in the US, and the welfare gain is equivalent to a permanent increase in consumption of 5.18%.
The welfare improvement in the UK is even more signicant at 8.11% due to the increase in wage
income relative to the US. We summarize these results in Table 2.
38Data source: OECD patent databases.
39Earlier data is not available.
40Unfortunately, we do not have data on patent grants by inventorsresidence of origin at the Intellectual Property
O¢ ce in the UK, so we use data from the EPO as a proxy.
41As before, we obtain PPP-adjusted real income per worker from the Penn World Table and then use OECD
data on labor income share to compute real wage income per worker in the two countries. OECD also provides
direct data on average annual wages, according to which relative wage of the two countries decreases from 1.30 in
1990 to 1.17 in 2007; unfortunately, earlier data is not available.
42We express welfare changes as the usual equivalent variation in annual consumption.
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Table 2: Simulated e¤ects on fwht =wft ; Uh; U fg
Data Model
Relative wage between the US and the UK in 1980 1:45 1:45
Relative wage between the US and the UK in 2007 1:03 1:26
Welfare changes in the US n=a 5:18%
Welfare changes in the UK n=a 8:11%
5 Conclusion
In this study, we have explored the macroeconomic e¤ects of labor unions in an open-economy
R&D-based growth model. We nd that the e¤ects of labor unions on employment, innovation
and economic growth are theoretically ambiguous and depend on their wage orientation. In the
case of the US and the UK, wage-oriented unions seem to t the data better by enabling the model
to replicate the observed decrease in labor income share, unemployment and relative wage across
countries. In this case, decreasing the bargaining power of unions stimulates employment and
economic growth, as some empirical studies (discussed in the introduction) tend to nd. However,
when it comes to employment-oriented unions, increasing their bargaining power would raise
employment and growth. These theoretical ndings suggest that there is no one-size-ts-all policy
when it comes to reforming existing labor-market institutions, such as labor unions. Therefore,
policymakers should make an e¤ort to understand the country-specic or even industry-specic
e¤ects of labor unions. Furthermore, to ensure analytical tractability, we have kept our model as
simple as possible and neglected many realistic features of the labor market. Hence, it would be
useful to structurally estimate the e¤ects of labor unions and workersbargaining power using a
more realistic model, and we leave this interesting extension to future research.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. If Nht =N
f
t is smaller than its unique steady-state value in (34) (i.e.,
Nht =N
f
t <
 
h=f
 (+(1 )")
[=(1   )]"  lh=lf(" 1)  ), then ht =f > h=f must hold, and
hence, vht = 
h and vft = 
f cannot hold at once, noting (17) and (29). In fact, one can show that
so long as Nht =N
f
t < ; 
h
t =rt = v
h
t = 
h and vft < 
f , implying _Nht > 0 and _N
f
t = 0. Following
Acemoglu (1998) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001), we have demonstrated that only one type
of innovation takes place o¤ the steady state. Furthermore, the economy converges to the steady
state and arrives there in nite time. In the steady state, Nht =N
f
t is constant over time implying
that Nht and N
f
t grow at the same rate. An analogous argument can be applied to the case of
Nht =N
f
t > .
Proof of Lemma 2. By (32) and vh = h; the interest rate is given by
r =
h
h
=

1  

 
2P h
 
lh
1=(1 )
h
. (A1)
Using (A1), the Euler equation (3) becomes
_cht
cht
=

1  

 
2P h
 
lh
1=(1 )
h
    g. (A2)
(5) can be rewritten as
P h =
h
" + (1  )"  P h=P f" 1i 1" 1 . (A3)
Substituting (34) into (29) leads to P h=P f = (h=f )(1 )
 
lh=lf
 
. Applying this to (A3) and
substituting the resulting expression into (A2), we can obtain (36).
Proof of Lemma 3. Under the assumption of home bias in asset holding, one can rewrite (2)
as
vht _N
h
t = rtv
h
tN
h
t + 
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t   cht , (A4)
where vht = 
h and hence _vht = 0. On the balanced growth path, we can solve (A4) for c
h
t :
cht = 
h
tN
h
t + 
h
t + w
h
t l
h
t   hgNht , (A5)
using rtvht = 
h
t and _N
h
t = gN
h
t . Using (17), we obtain
htN
h
t = 
(1+)=(1 ) (1  ) (lh)P h 11  Nht . (A6)
Here it holds that
(lh)P h =
 
h
1  h
"
 
h
 (1 )(" 1)
(lh)(" 1) + (1  )"  f (1 )(" 1)  lf(" 1)i 1" 1
=

h (g + )
(1+)=(1 ) (1  )
1 
, (A7)
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where the rst equality comes from (A3) with P h=P f = (h=f )(1 )
 
lh=lf
 
and the second
equality comes from (36). Using (23) and (24), we obtain
ht + w
h
t l
h
t = (1  )P ht Xht = 2=(1 )(1  )

(lh)P h
1=(1 )
Nht , (A8)
where we have used (28) for the second equality. Substituting (A6)-(A8) into (A5) yields
cht = 
h

(1 + ) + g


Nht . (A9)
Substituting (A9) into (38) yields (39). Finally, cft can be derived analogously.
Proof of Proposition 2. It is shown in (25) that an increase in !h causes a decrease in
employment lh, which increases wht =w
f
t in the short run (i.e., taking N
h
t =N
f
t as given) through
(31). In the long run, the decrease in lh reduces Nht =N
f
t (i.e., innovation to be directed towards
the Foreign country) given " > 1; see (34). Finally, as shown in (35), this results in a reduction in
wht =w
f
t if and only if ("  1) > 1; which is equivalent to " > (1 + )=. Finally, for the e¤ect of
!h on long-run growth, use Lemma 2. For the e¤ect on domestic welfare, use Lemma 3 and note
the decrease in g together with _Nht = 0 and _N
f
t > 0 on the transitional path to the new steady
state of Nht =N
f
t , which is lower than before.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under a wage-oriented union, we have !h > 1. We rst address the
short run by taking Nht =N
f
t as given in (31). Using this fact and (25), we can rewrite (31) as
ln(wht =w
f
t ) = ln[+
h(1  )]   +  + (1    )"
 + (1  )" ln

 + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A10)
where we have omitted some exogenous terms for simplicity. Di¤erentiating (A10) yields
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )
@h
=
1    
 + h(1    ) +
 +  + (1    )"
 + (1  )"
(!h   1)(1    )
 + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A11)
which is positive given !h > 1. In the rest of this proof, we address the long run by considering
(35). In an analogous manner, we can derive from (35)
ln(wht =w
f
t ) = ln[ + 
h(1    )] + [("  1)  1] ln  + (1  !h)h(1    ) , (A12)
where some exogenous terms are omitted again for simplicity. Di¤erentiating (A12) yields
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )
@h
=
1    
 + h(1    )   [("  1)  1]
(!h   1)(1    )
 + (1  !h)h(1    ) . (A13)
From (A13), it can be shown that @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h < 0 if and only if " > ". Finally, for the e¤ect
of h on long-run growth, use Lemma 2. For the e¤ect on domestic welfare, use Lemma 3 as in
the proof for Proposition 2.
Proof of Proposition 4. Under an employment-oriented union, we have !h < 1. First, we con-
sider the short-run e¤ect by examining (A10) and (A11). In (A11), @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is monotoni-
cally increasing in !h and takes a strictly positive value at !h = 0. Therefore, @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is
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always positive for any !h > 0. Then, we examine the long-run e¤ect using (A13). If (" 1) > 1,
then @ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h > 0 must hold because !h < 1. If ("   1) < 1, then @ ln(wht =wft )=@h in
(A13) is monotonically increasing in !h and takes a strictly positive value at !h = 0. Therefore,
@ ln(wht =w
f
t )=@
h is always positive for any !h 2 (0; 1). Finally, for the e¤ect of h on long-run
growth, use Lemma 2. For the e¤ects on domestic and foreign welfare, use Lemma 3 and note the
increase in g together with _Nht > 0 and _N
f
t = 0 on the transitional path to the new steady state
of Nht =N
f
t ; which is higher than before.
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Appendix B: Balance of payments
Suppose nal goods are produced in country f . Lets denote ~s 2 [0; 1] as the share of monop-
olistic intermediate-good rms owned by country h, sh 2 [0; 1] as the share of Home inventions
created by country h, and sf 2 [0; 1] as the share of Foreign inventions created by country f .43
Also, lets allow for cross-country bond holding by denoting Dht as a foreign debt of country h.
In other words, country fs foreign asset (in terms of country hs bond) is equal to  Dht . Here,
without any loss of generality, we assume that the Home country is a borrower country. Then,
the following lemma holds.
Lemma 4 The current account CAt for country h is given by
CAt = P
h
t X
h
t   (htNht + ht + wht lht + xhtNht + _Dht ): (B1)
Proof. Under the above assumptions, country h exportsXht units of intermediate goods to country
f , whereas country f exports cht +x
h
tN
h
t + [s
hh _Nht + (1  sf )f _N ft ] units of nal goods to country
h. Therefore, the net export of the value of goods from country h is equal to
P ht X
h
t   cht   xhtNht   shh _Nht   (1  sf )f _N ft . (B2a)
Country h also exports the value (1   sf )ftN ft + ~sft of capital services to country f , whereas
country f exports the value
 
1  shhtNht + (1  ~s) ht + rtDht of capital services to country h.
Therefore, the net export of capital services from country h is equal to
(1  sf )ftN ft + ~sft  
 
1  sh htNht   (1  ~s) ht   rtDht . (B2b)
Consumption cht in country h can be derived from the asset-accumulation equation as
44
cht = s
hhtN
h
t + (1  sf )ftN ft   rtDht + ~s(ht + ft ) +wht lht   shh _Nht   (1  sf )f _N ft + _Dht . (B3)
By summing up (B2a) and (B2b) with (B3), the current account becomes (B1).
Given Lemma 4, we now show that the balance of payment holds. To do so, we derive each
term in the right-hand side of (B1). From (28), we have
P ht X
h
t = 
2
1 

(lh)P ht
 1
1  Nht . (B4a)
Then, by using (17), we have
htN
h
t = 
1+
1  (1  ) (lht )P ht  11  Nht . (B4b)
43The setup nests the assumption in Lemma 3 as a special case with sh = sf = 1, ~s = ht =(
h
t +
f
t ) and D
h
t = 0.
44Using the denitions of ~s; sh; and sf , we can re-express (2) as

[shvht N
h
t + (1  sf )vft Nft ]  _Dht = rt[shvht Nht + (1  sf )vft Nft  Dht ] + ~s(ht + ft ) + wht lht   cht .
Using the equilibrium conditions rtvzt = 
z
t and v
z
t = 
z for z = h; f , we obtain (B3).
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With (B4a), (24) becomes
ht = (1  h)(1    )
2
1 

(lh)P ht
 1
1  Nht , (B4c)
whereas (23) becomes
wht l
h
t =

 + h(1    )  21  (lh)P ht  11  Nht . (B4d)
Recall that (16) is given by
xhtN
h
t = 
2
1 

P ht (l
h
t )

 1
1  Nht . (B4e)
Finally, it can be shown that substituting (B4) into (B1) yields CAt =   _Dht . Given that the
capital account of country h is equal to _Dht , the balance of payment holds.
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Appendix C (not for publication)
In this appendix C, we show that it is the ratio    f=h(1 )(" 1) [=(1  )]" that a¤ects
the quantitative results and that given a value of , the individual values of fh; f ; g do not
matter. Therefore, one of these parameters can be treated as a free parameter. First of all, note
from (25) and (26) that the equilibrium values of flh; lfg are independent of fh; f ; g.
From (35), we see that given assigned values for the relative wage wh=wf , relative employment
lh=lf , labor income shares f + h(1     );  + h(1     )g and the substitution elasticity
", the equation pins down a unique value of , which is dened as
 

f
h
(1 )(" 1)

1  
"
=
wht
wft

lf
lh
(" 1) 1
 + f (1    )
 + h(1    ) . (C1)
Then, we can reexpress (36) as
g = (1  )(1+)=(1 )

(1  )"
(f )(1 )(" 1)
h

 
lh
(" 1)
+
 
lf
(" 1)i 1(1 )(" 1)   . (C2)
Therefore, given the values of f; ; "; ; lh; lf ; gg and, (C2) pins down a value of (1 )"=(f )(1 )(" 1).
Suppose we choose a value of f . Then, (C1) and (C2) determine the values of fh; g.
Manipulating (34), we obtain
hNht
fN ft
= 

lh
lf
(" 1)
. (C3)
Therefore, given the values of f; "; lh; lfg and, we have pined down a unique value of (hNht )=(fN ft )
in (C3). Although the choice of f a¤ects the value of Nht =N
f
t , it does not a¤ect the change in
ln(Nht =N
f
t ) when ln(l
h=lf ) changes as shown in (34). Similarly, one can use (C2) to show that
given the values of  and (1  )"=(f )(1 )(" 1), the choice of f neither a¤ects the value of g nor
its change with respect to changes in flh; lfg. Finally, from (38), we see that it is the changes in
ln(Nht =N
f
t ) and g that a¤ect the change in U
j; in other words, although the choice of f a¤ects
the level of U j, it does not a¤ect the change in U j.
29
